Battle of the Coral Sea
May 7-8, 1942. Operation "MO" the Port Moresby
operation, under the overall command of Vice-Admiral Shigeyoshi Inouye,
was
to be preceded by the capture of Tulagi in
the
Solomons. The strike group to
protect the expedition was commanded by Vice-Admiral Takagi with
the powerful aircraft-carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku plus two cruisers
and six destroyers and was to sweep through the Coral Sea. A Cover
Group, under Rear-Admiral Goto, consisted of the light
aircraft carrier Shoho, four heavy cruisers and one destroyer.
If sucessful, then bomb the airfields at Townsville, Cooktown and
Thursday Island.
After it covered the Tulagi landing, the force turned
back west to protect the Port Moresby Invasion Group of 11 transports,
carrying both army troops and a naval landing force, which, screened
by destroyers were to steam round the eastern end of Papua, through
the Jomard Passage. Inouye thought he could envelop the allied
fleet with Goto on the west flank and Takagi on the east, while
the Invasion Group slipped through the Jomard Passage to Port
Moresby.
With the Allied fleet destroyed he could then proceed with the
bombing of bases in northern Queensland.
The Americans had succeeded in completely breaking
the Japanese naval code and possessed accurate and fairly detailed
intelligence concerning the Japanese plans. However, the US had only
limited forces available to take advantage of this knowledge. Only
Rear-Admiral Aubrey W Fitch's Task Force 11 with the aircraft-carrier
Lexington and Rear-Admiral Frank J Fletcher's Task Force 17 with the
aircraft-carrier Yorktown were available.
Fletcher was in tactical command of the whole force
and ordered to operate in the Coral Sea from 1 May. Task Force 44,
under Rear Admiral Crace, RN, with Australian heavy cruisers Australia
and Hobart in Sydney and USS Chicago CA-29 and destroyer
Perkins at Noumea, were ordered to rendezvous with Fletcher in the
Coral Sea. Fitch's Lexington force joined Fletcher as planned at 0630
hours on 1 May. Both aircraft-carriers commenced refuelling. Fitch
estimated that his refuelling would not be completed until 4 May whereas
Fletcher only required 24 hours. Fletcher decided not wait for Fitch
to refuel or Crace to arrive and steamed west on the 2nd, leaving
orders for Fitch to rejoin him by daylight on the 4th.
On the evening of the 3rd Fletcher learnt of the
landing at Tulagi and set off north to attack next morning. Fletcher
rejoined Fitch and Crace about 0816 on 5 May and spent most of
the day refuelling from Neosho. Meanwhile, Takagi's Strike Group
had moved down along the outer coast of the Solomons and was well
into the Coral Sea by dawn on 6 May.
The Port Moresby Invasion Group was on a southerly
course for the Jomard Passage, while Goto's Cover Group began
refuelling south of Bougainville,
completing this task by 0830 the next morning. Inouye not knowing
where the Fletcher was, used most of his aircraft on the 5th in
a bombing attack on Port Moresby. On the 6th, the oilier Neosho,
escorted by the Destroyer USS
Sims, was detached at 1755, and
told to head south for the next fuelling rendezvous. Fletcher was
receiving intelligence reports regarding the movements of Japanese
ships and it became fairly obvious that the Japanese invasion force
would come through the Jomard Passage on the 7th or 8th. He cut
short fuelling operations and headed north-west at 1930 on 6 May,
to be within strike distance by daylight on the 7th.
At 1030 hours on 6 May B-17s from Australia located
and bombed the Shoho south of Bougainville. The bombs fall wide, but
aircraft again spotted the Goto's Cover Group around noon and later
located the Port Moresby Invasion force near the Jomard Passage. Estimating
that Fletcher was about 500 miles to the south-west, and expecting
him to attack the next day, Inouye ordered that all operations should
continue according to schedule. At midnight the invasion transports
were near Misima Island, ready to slip through the Jomard Passage.
At 0736 on May 7th one of Takagi's reconnaissance
aircraft reported sighting an aircraft-carrier and a cruiser.
This evaluation was accepted, the distance was closed and an all-out
bombing and torpedo attack ordered. In fact, the sighted vessels
were the Neosho and the USS Sims. Both ships were repeatedly attacked
by Japanese aircraft, and at about noon, the Sims sank with the
loss of 379 lives. The Neosho suffered seven direct hits and drifted
until 11 May when 123 men were taken off and the oilier was scuttled.
At 0645, Fletcher ordered Crace's support group
to push ahead on a north-westerly course to attack the Port Moresby
Invasion Group, while the rest of Task Force 17 turned north. A Japanese
seaplane spotted the support group at 0810 and in the afternoon when
the ships of Crace's force were south and a little west of Jomard
Passage they were successively attacked by land-based single-engined
bombers, navy bombers and high-level bombers. A final attack by three
bombers flying at 25,000 feet was later discovered to have been American
B-26s stationed at Townsville. The support group had beaten off all
the attacks and Crace had dispelled the Japanese myth that a naval
force could not survive repeated attacks from land-based aircraft.
While Takagi's aircraft were attacking Neosho and
Sims, the Shoho of Goto's Cover Group, had turned south-east into
the wind to launch four reconnaissance aircraft and to send up other
aircraft to protect the Invasion Group 30 miles to the south-west.
By 0830 Goto knew exactly where Fletcher was, and ordered Shoho to
prepare for an attack. Other aircraft had meanwhile spotted Crace's
ships to the west. The result of these reports was to make Inouye
anxious for the security of the Invasion Group, and at 0900 he ordered
it to turn away instead of entering Jomard Passage, thus keeping it
out of harm's way until Fletcher and Crace had been dealt with. In
fact, this was the nearest the transports got to their goal.
At 0815 one of Yorktown's reconnaissance aircraft
reported two carriers and four heavy cruisers about 225 miles to the
north-west, on the other side of the Louisiades.
Assuming that this was Takagi's Strike Group, Fletcher launched a
total of 93 aircraft between 0926 and 1030. However, no sooner had
Yorktown's attack group become airborne than the scout returned and
it was immediately discovered that an error in the pilot's coding
pad meant the two carriers and four heavy cruisers should have read
two heavy cruisers and two destroyers. Fletcher allowed the strike
to proceed despite the error in the hope that the invasion force or
other profitable targets were in the vicinity.
The attack group from Lexington, well ahead of the
Yorktown aircraft, was nearing Misima Island in the Louisiades shortly
after 1100, when it spotted an aircraft-carrier, two or three cruisers,
and some destroyers about 25 miles to the starboard. This was the
Shoho with the rest of Goto's Cover Group. As the Shoho was only 35
miles south-east of the original target location, it was a simple
matter to redirect the attack groups over the carrier. Under a concentrated
attack, the Shoho stood little chance and was soon on fire and dead
in the water. The Shoho sank soon after 1135. After the air groups
safely landed, Fletcher set a westerly course during the night of
7/8 May. Both sides expected a decision on the 8th with everything
depending on locating the enemy as early as possible in the morning.
One of Lexington's scouts sighted the Japanese carriers
at 0815 and reported that Takagi was 175 miles to the north-east of
Fletcher's position. At 0930, the Japanese Strike Group was sighted
steaming due south in a position 25 miles north-east of the original
contact, but about 45 miles north of Takagi's expected position at
0900 as predicted on the strength of the first contact. The discrepancy
was to cause trouble for Lexington's attack group, which by this time
was airborne. Fitch had begun launching his strike between 0900 and
0925, the Yorktown group of 24 bombers with two fighters, and nine
torpedo-bombers with four fighters, departing ten minutes before the
Lexington aircraft. The dive-bombers spotted the Japanese first, at
1030, and took cloud cover to await the arrival of the torpedo-bombers.
While Shokaku was engaged in launching further combat patrols, Zuikaku disappeared into a rain squall.
The attack, which began at 1057, thus fell only on
the Shokaku. Although the Yorktown pilots co-ordinated their attack
well, only moderate success was achieved. The American torpedoes were
either avoided or failed to explode, and only two bomb hits were scored
on the Shokaku, one damaging the flight-deck well forward on the starboard
bow and setting fire to fuel, while the other destroyed a repair compartment
aft. The burning Shokaku could recover but no longer launch aircraft.
Only 15 of 37 Lexington aircraft located the target. The torpedoes
were again ineffective, but the bombers scored a third hit on the
Shokaku. Although 108 of the vessel's crew had been killed, she had
not been holed below the water-line, and her fires were soon brought
under control. Most of her aircraft were transferred to the Zuikaku before Takagi detached Shokaku at 1300, with orders to proceed to
Truk.
The Yorktown and Lexington came under attack in the
interval between the strikes of their respective air groups on the
Japanese aircraft-carriers. The Japanese had begun launching at about
the same time as the Americans, but their attack group of 18 torpedo-bombers,
33 bombers, and 18 fighters was larger, better balanced, and more
accurately directed to the target. Although the American radar picked
them up 70 miles away, Fitch had far too few fighters to intercept
successfully, and was forced to rely mainly on his AA gunners for
protection. At 1118 hours the Japanese aircraft commenced their attack.
The Yorktown, with a smaller turning circle than the Lexington, successfully
avoided eight torpedoes launched on her port quarter. Five minutes
later she came under dive-bomber attack but escaped unscathed until
1127 when she received her only hit, an 800-pound bomb which penetrated
to the fourth deck, but did not impair flight operations. During this
time, the evasive manoeuvres gradually drew the American aircraft-carriers
apart and, although the screening vessels divided fairly evenly between
them, the breaking of their defensive circle contributed to Japanese
success.
The Lexington had a larger turning circle than the
Yorktown and despite valiant manoeuvres received one torpedo hit on
the port side at 1120, quickly followed by a second opposite the bridge.
At the same time a dive-bombing attack commenced from 17,000 feet,
the Lexington receiving two hits from small bombs. A list of 7 degrees
caused by the torpedo hits was corrected by shifting oil ballast,
while her engines remained unharmed. To her returning pilots she did
not appear to be seriously damaged, and the recovery of the air group
went ahead. At 1247, a tremendous internal explosion, caused by the
ignition of fuel vapours by a motor generator which had been left
running, shook the whole ship. A series of further violent explosions
seriously disrupted internal communications. Yet another major detonation
occurred at 1445, and the fires soon passed beyond control. The destroyer
Morris came alongside to help fight the blaze but the need for evacuation
became increasingly apparent. At 1630 hours the Lexington had come
to a dead stop, and all hands prepared to abandon ship.
At 1710 the Minneapolis, Hammann, Morris, and Anderson
moved to evacuate the crew. The destroyer Phelps fired five torpedoes
at 1956 and the Lexington sank at 2000. The Battle of the Coral Sea
was now over. The Japanese pilots had reported sinking both American
aircraft-carriers, and the acceptance of this evaluation influenced
Takagi's decision to detach the Shokaku for repairs, as well as Inouye's
order that the Strike Group should be withdrawn. Even though he thought
that both American aircraft-carriers had been destroyed, the cautious
Inouye still deemed it necessary to postpone the invasion, apparently
because he felt unable to protect the landing units against Allied
land-based aircraft. Yamamoto did not agree with this decision and,
at 2400 hours, countermanded the order, detailing Takagi to locate
and annihilate the remaining American ships. But, by the time Takagi
made his search to the south and east, Fletcher was out of reach.
Outcome
The Japanese had achieved a material victory
but despite their losses, the Americans were able to repair
the Yorktown in time for Midway less than one month later where
the war decisively turned against Japan. The Coral Sea was a
decisive strategic American victory. The Japanese operation
to capture Port Moresby was thwarted and the Australian eastern
coast was not attacked (other than air raids and shelling). The battle was of great significance in
the development of naval warfare since, for the first time, fleets
had fought one another without direct visual contact. The aircraft
carrier had replaced the battleship as the backbone of the fleet.
Air Force bombers join the battle but their effect is limited;
several bombers attack Allied vessels by mistake.
American Losses
Lost 33 (15 Lexington plus 35 when it sank, 16 x Yorktown) aircraft, and the ships: Lexington, Neosho, and Sims. Two RAAF Catalinas were lost: PBY A29-18 and PBY A29-20.
